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INTRODUCTION 
In The Legal Foundations of Inequality, Gargarella provides a sophisticated 
account of the constitutional history of the Americas. The Legal Foundations 
of Inequality is not merely a historical survey; it provides an analytic frame 
within which the legal development in the continent of America can be un-
derstood and become intelligible. It also develops a normative critique of the 
major legal and political movements and provides an alternative egalitarian 
route for the future.
I was greatly enriched by reading it. Needless to say I cannot contribute 
to the historical account provided by Gargarella. This essay aims therefore at 
examining the contemporary relevance of Gargarella historical insights. Part 
i examines the three primary movements identified by Gargarella (radicalism, 
conservativism and liberalism). I try to identify and sharpen some of the 
sentiments underlying these ideologies and, finally, I show that contemporary 
political and legal developments can be enriched by understanding the history. 
Radicalism of the 19th century can be equated with contemporary populism; 
the ancesstor of 19th century conservativism is nationalism and liberalism 
has retained its original name. I establish that these three ideologies are as 
influential as they have been in the 19th century. I also argue that economic 
interests are as important now in shaping political realities as they have been 
in the history described by Gargarella. Part ii provides a normative account; 
more particularly, it aims at mitigating the tension identified by Gargarella 
between individual and collective self-governance. 
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Gargarella’s work is not merely theoretical; he writes with a passion which 
indicates that his work is also designed to improve the society in which he 
lives. This essay is designed precisely to honor this aspect in Gargraella’s 
work; it shows that Garagarella account of the past can be the key for un-
derstanding the present and improving the future. 
1. RADICALISM, CONSERVATIVISM AND LIBERALISM 
The politics of the Americas was governed by three main political move-
ments: radicalism which emphasizes self-governance, conservativism which 
is founded on political elitism and moral perfectionism and liberalism which 
cherishes individual rights and often also free markets. The politics and the 
constitutional framework of the Americas was determined by the interplay 
between these three movements. Often, as Gargarella shows, two of these 
movements (conservatives and liberals) joined forces to oppose the third 
(radicals). 
The terms: radicalism, conservativism and liberalism are ideological 
abstractions. In reality the political movements designed to implement these 
ideals consist of different people and sentiments which do not always cohere 
with the ideologies as understood in political theory. Politics, after all, is never 
merely political theory; it is never a simple translation of political ideologies 
into practice and policies. In the process of translating theory into practice, 
various institutional, personal and other contingent factors transform some of 
the ideological commitments and the story of the Americas is not an exception. 
Further, each of these movements consisted of various features which 
are unified by what Wittgenstein has called family resemblance. Often the 
movements had certain substantive and procedural ideals but they did not 
always promote all of these ideals and, at times, even fought against some 
of them. This makes the task of describing these three movements without 
providing numerous qualifications a particularly difficult one. Nevertheless, 
at the risk of being a charlatan, let me provide a rough description following 
the description by Garagrella. 
Radicals praised self-governance and were opposed therefore to legal 
mechanisms which limit the power of self-governance such as a bill of rights 
or judicial review. Instead, they were sympathetic to institutional structures 
that enable voters to monitor carefully and to influence the decisions of their 
representatives. Conservatives were, as a rule, hostile to self-governance 
given that they had certain conceptions of the good which they wished to 
realize by using legal means. Most typically these conceptions of the good 
were religious ones. Liberals were opposed to collective self-governance 
given their concern to protect certain rights and freedoms and, in particular, 
the right to property. In the following more detailed discussion I wish to 
highlight the underlying sentiments beneath each one of these movements. 
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Last I point out the ways in which these ideologies can be shown to shape 
the political landscape of contemporary societies. 
Radicalism is understood by Gargarella as a movement that advocates 
political majoritarianism and desires to strengthen the authority of the people 
and their political powers. To do so, radicals typically advocate institutional 
mechanisms designed to reinforce the influence of the people in political 
decision-making. For instance, radicals would oppose granting power to 
courts and other non-elected institutions; they would advocate closer relations 
between the people and the representatives. They also advocate designing 
mechanisms for reinforcing deference on the part of the representatives (in-
cluding in extreme cases even granting people the power to dismiss repre-
sentatives who deviate from their duties to defer to the will of the people).
Gargarella identifies from the outset one prominent value underlying 
radicalism: the desire for self-governance. I would argue that radicalism 
can be justified in several different ways each of which has its own logic 
and each has its own institutional ramifications. Let me distinguish between 
three different ways to ground radicalism: a republican or freedom-based, a 
consequentialist and a relativist justification. 
The republican argument rests on the conviction that all members of the 
society ought to have a decisive say in self-government. Self-government is 
a right in itself and people are entitled to make decisions concerning their 
own future (230). Self-governance is understood as a form of freedom: col-
lective freedom, namely the freedom of the community as a whole to pursue 
its goals and values. 
The second argument is a consequentialist one which maintains that 
decisions made by the people as a whole would in the long run promote the 
public good better than other institutional mechanisms. The assumption here 
is that people are endowed with a ‘moral sense’ as Jefferson put it and, con-
sequently, that they would be able to effectively participate in the governing 
of the polity and make the right choices (215). In fact, some radicals have 
said that without consulting all those potentially affected, decision-makers 
lose fundamental information without which they cannot make an informed 
decision (23). Under this justification the participation of the nation as a 
whole is necessary for reaching the right and the just decisions.
The last possible justification is absent in Garagarella analysis presumably 
because it had no echo in the political realities in the Americas. It is sometimes 
maintained that the citizens as a whole should participate in decision-making 
because there is no right and wrong in politics and, consequently, every de-
cision is as good as any other. This form of relativism cannot be sustained 
philosophically but it has had influence on actual politics.1
1 Note that although the first (republican) and the second justification (consequentialist) 
are distinct, they are often interrelated. For instance, Gargrarella writes that collective self-government 
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It is easy to see the affinity between radicalism as described by Gargarella 
and contemporary populism. Populists claim that representatives represent the 
people by complying with their preferences and judgments. Further, contem-
porary populists often share the hostility of 19th century radicals to the courts 
and other intermediate institutions which mediate between the people and 
their government and thereby, according to populists, distort the real will of 
the people. Those institutions are perceived both by contemporary populists 
and by radicals as elitist and detached from the real sentiments of the nation. 
There is however one feature which is fundamentally different between 
contemporary populists and radicals. The, radicals as described by Gargarella, 
have been highly sympathetic to redistribution of resources and to support 
for the poor. This is not a characteristic which is shared by contemporary 
populists. In fact, I will argue later that contemporary populism is used to 
distract attention from the economic inequalities characterizing contempo-
rary societies. 
Conservativism is described by Gargarella as a combination of political 
authoritarianism and moral perfectionism. Political authoritarianism is dia-
metrically opposed to self-governance. Advocates of political authoritarianism 
such as Edmund Burke believe that governance is an expertise which should 
be reserved therefore to experts. The people should not govern because they 
cannot govern and they cannot govern because they lack the expertise to govern. 
In the context of conservativism, this view is accompanied by moral per-
fectionism under which there is a right conception of the good and it is the 
task of the state to guide people to lead the good life. Further, the good life 
is not the one that we happen to prefer to have or happen to value; it is one 
that is determined externally and objectively independently of us. In addition, 
conservatives believe that the law can guide us to realize the conception of 
the good and, to do so, it is legitimate to use force when it is needed. The 
use of legal force is (or, at least, may be) needed to protect the moral fabric 
of the community. In the Americas the conception of the good favored by 
conservatives has typically been a religious form of life. At times this led 
to religious persecution of minority religions and, at other times, merely to 
privileges granted to certain religious groups and denied to others.
The most typical justification of conservativism is of course the conviction 
that some forms of life, eg. Catholicism are good ones but often one finds 
an argument favoring conservative agendas on other grounds: the conviction 
that homogeneity, conformism and order are important values without which 
a political community cannot be sustained (92-93). A characteristic expression 
of these sentiments was made by Gabriel García Moreno who said: “The 
conveys the conviction in the wisdom of the people and their ability to make decisions for them-
selves (230). Hence the right to self-governance is designed to manifest a trust in the power of 
reasoning of citizens and their ability to pursue the public good. 
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first [goal of my power] will be that of harmonizing our political institutions 
with our religious beliefs; and the second will be that of investing our public 
authorities with the forces required to resist the assaults of anarchy” (92).
So, in addition to the conviction that there is a right or correct or decent 
way of life which needs to be strictly enforced, conservatives also share 
certain beliefs concerning the need for order, discipline and homogeneity. 
In contemporary society, one finds many manifestations of this view. Often 
however these sentiments take the form of nationalism rather than religion. 
The prevalent hostility to immigration also reflects the sympathy towards 
homogeneity and cultural conformism. Hence, I believe that contemporary 
nationalists can be described as the authentic ancesstors of conservatives as 
described by Gargrarella. 
Liberalism: In the Americas the liberal tradition was associated with strict 
and often absolute protection of rights and protection of ‘free markets.’ Liberals 
defend the autonomy of each person, namely his or her right to choose freely 
and develop her own conception of the good even when this conception is 
not shared or even offensive to others. To guarantee the protection of these 
rights, liberals were willing to limit the power of the citizens to govern. As 
the people did not always share the liberal worldview, liberals joined forces 
with conservatives in order to limit the political power of the citizens. From 
the perspective of liberals, this coalition was intended to protect individual 
freedom against the will of the people by limiting their collective freedoms. 
Institutionally this took the form of rigid constitutional provisions and pow-
erful courts designed to protect rights.
Gargarella emphasizes the coalition between conservatives and liberals 
designed to address the radical threat – the threat of collective self-governance. 
This coalition is in his view the primary force which governed the Americas 
and it provides the best explanation for its legal and constitutional develop-
ment. This coalition was ultimately based on fear, in particular the fear of 
governance by the people (223). This fear was at least partly motivated by 
economic concerns, in particular, the fear that collective self-governance 
would lead to a major egalitarian redistribution of resources (224). Let me 
explore the ways in which this framework can be used to explain not our 
history but also our present.
Interestingly in contemporary societies a different coalition is being 
formed which, I dare to conjecture, is also motivated by economic concerns: 
a coalition between populists (the contemporary ancesstors of radicals) and 
nationalists (the contemporary ancesstors of conservatives). Populism is a 
proceduralist theory. In its pure form, it merely advocates a certain proce-
duralist mechanism for decision-making. Hence, in principle, it can cooper-
ate with any other movement whatever its substantive commitments are as 
long as these commitments are shared by the majority. It seems natural that 
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when the majority supports a certain substantive view, eg conservativism, the 
advocates of this substantive view would join forces with populists. 
The contemporary reincarnation of this phenomenon is as follows: populists 
and nationalists form a coalition targeting liberalism. Further, as I argued 
earlier I suspect this coalition rests also on economic considerations. Unlike 
the liberalism described by Gargarella, contemporary liberalism is not hostile 
to redistribution and some of the most vocal liberals advocate redistribution of 
resources. By cherishing nationalist sentiments, the coalition of populists and 
nationalists distracts attention from the economic inequalities and relegates 
the vast economic inequalities to the margins of politics. It thereby facilitates 
the contemporary economic exploitation of vast number of workers. 
Let me illustrate this dynamic in the context of Israel. The Israeli public 
has become conservative and, in particular, nationalist. Due to legal and 
constitutional constraints the nationalist agenda cannot be fully realized. 
The courts limited the pursuit of certain nationalist policies on the grounds 
that they are unconstitutional. The nationalists use populist rhetoric to attack 
the courts (and other institutions such as the media). Their argument does 
not rest on the claim that the nationalist policies they pursue are just but 
on the (populist or radical) claim that this is the will of the people and the 
will of the people ought to be honored.2 This tactic distracts attention from 
the vast economic inequalities and thus facilitates the pursuit of neo-liberal 
polices which gradually lead to the degeneration of public services. Hence, 
instead of the 19th century coalition of conservatives and liberals designed 
to overcome the radical agenda and thereby secure the right to property, one 
may currently find a coalition of the populists and nationalists designed to 
overcome the liberals and, thereby, secure the very same economic inequali-
ties. It is evident that the historical analysis developed by Gargrarella and 
the theoretical framework proposed by him can be used to shed light on 
contemporary politics.
2. THE EGALITARIAN PROPOSAL AND THE LIBERAL DILEMMA
At the end of The Legal Foundation of Inequality, Gargarella provides his sharp 
critique of the three dominant movements and, in particular, of the radicals 
and the liberals. Under his view, the liberals failed to value the importance 
of collective self-governance ie to facilitate broad political participation and 
collective self-governance. In his view the liberals violated their own principle 
of equality by failing to acknowledge the significance of political equality. 
2   For a description of this dynamic, see: https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2019-posts/2019/3/22/
symposium-chief-justice-baraks-legal-revolutions-and-what-remains-of-them-the-authoritarian-
abuse-of-the-judicial-empowerment-revolution
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Further, the liberal agenda and, in particular, the protection of the right 
to property undermined even the primary and the most cherished liberal 
ideal – the ideal of individual self-governance. As Gargarella argues some 
degree of economic prosperity is necessary for realizing the core ideals of 
liberalism. In particular, some degree of economic prosperity is necessary for 
developing a conception of the good and making intelligible choices designed 
to pursue the conception of the good. By rejecting economic redistribution, 
liberals betrayed their own agenda and frustrated the ability of individuals 
to gain individual freedom.
The ideal of equality as understood by Gargarella requires both collective 
and individual equality. 
Both ideals are important and both should be honored by the political and 
legal institutions. Yet, as Garagarella is quick to note, the tension between 
individual and collective governance exists and should be acknowledged 
and addressed rather than ignored. The primary question that needs to be 
answered is how to reconcile the two. To address this question Gargrarella 
suggests to differentiate between different spheres: the personal sphere and 
the collective sphere: personal problems should be handled by each individual 
and collective problems should be confronted and solved collectively (230). 
Individual self-governance should prevail with respect to personal problems 
and collective self-governance should prevail with respect to collective 
problems. This proposed solution does not entail that the tension disappears 
as identifying what counts as personal and what counts as collective would 
inevitably be controversial. It entails however that both individual and collec-
tive self-governance should be honored and be regarded as important values.
I share this conviction and I also share the belief that even the realization 
of individual self-governance hinges on certain economic preconditions and 
those economic preconditions require a radical redistribution of resources. I 
wish however to focus on a different promising way to mitigate the tension 
between collective and individual self-governance. More particularly, I wish 
to look more carefully at a concept which is mentioned by Gargarella himself 
but is not fully developed, namely the understanding that the voice of the 
people should be refined by their representatives. To faithfully represent the 
people does not always imply merely to replicate their views; it requires to 
shape them in light of the underlying values. This insight was first articulated 
by Madison. Gargarella presents this view as follows: 
The argument can be stated as follows: given that certain majoritarian procedures 
only help us to discover an unrefined version of the majority will, we need to 
adopt different refining procedures. In the end, it is arguable that the system of 
checks and balances, for example, helps us to refine the voice of the people, as 
Madison put it in Federalist 10, and not to disregard it. (228).
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Gargarella rejects the view that checks and balances refine the voice of 
the people, but this does not imply rejection of the assertion that the voice 
of the people needs to be refined. I believe that the political system needs to 
take seriously the perspective of the people and thereby facilitate collective 
self-governance, but sometimes taking seriously the perspective of the people 
requires deviating from the policies they advocate or judge to be correct. Our 
political representatives need to talk in the name of the people but this does 
not imply that they are merely pipes of the existing convictions of the people 
or that they ought to defer to the particular policies that the people support or 
advocate. Sometimes, precisely because representatives ought to honor the 
voice of the people, they need to adopt policies with which the public disagrees. 
To establish this claim we need to ask what does it mean to take seriously 
the perspective of the people and to follow their inner convictions? Arguably, 
the most natural answer is the populist answer that maintains that ideally, the 
representative should merely mirror the actual preferences and judgements of 
her constituents. This ‘populist’ answer also explains why the decisions and 
actions of the representative can be attributed to the represented. After all it 
could be argued that the representative merely did what the people wanted 
and, hence, responsibility for the act should be attributed to the people. 
I contend that this view fails to acknowledge the complexity of preferences 
and judgements; for instance, the prevalence of conditional and second-order 
preferences. Representation is indeed about endorsing the perspective of the 
represented, yet, at times, endorsing one’s perspective requires deviating 
from some of one’s actual preferences and/or convictions.3
The following hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that the repre-
sentative Alan represents Daniel who supports capital punishment. Daniel 
believes (assume unjustifiably) that capital punishment deters and is therefore 
desirable. Assume also that Daniel is a consequentialist who believes that if 
capital punishment does not deter it ought not to be used. What should the 
representative do?
The populist view as understood here holds that representation requires 
the representative, Alan, to support capital punishment on the grounds that 
this is what the represented, Daniel, would have done. But, it is intuitively 
plausible to argue that if Alan knows that, in fact, capital punishment does 
3 An analogy from visual representation might be helpful. A photograph is often regarded 
as an accurate and therefore perfect representation of a person, and there is of course a sense in 
which it is. But, in certain respects, a caricature can represent a person better than a photo. It is 
precisely because a caricature fails to depict some features of the represented and exaggerates 
other features that it may represent a person better than a photograph (see, e.g., Sontag, S. On 
Photography. London: Penguin Books, 1977). Similarly, it is precisely because the representative 
ignores certain actual preferences and judgments of the represented while honoring others, that 
she may represent her better than a populist, namely better than a deputy who always defers to 
the preferences and judgments of the represented.
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not deter, he ought to vote against capital punishment as only such a decision 
on his part honors the conviction of the represented that capital punishment 
is justified only to the extent that it deters. Alan’s decision to oppose capital 
punishment is not designed to promote the interests of the represented or 
even to do justice, but simply to represent; to give effect to Daniel’s ‘real’ 
commitments even when they deviate from his actual convictions concerning 
capital punishment. In the language of Madison, the representatives have “to 
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of 
a chosen body of citizens.”4 
It is evident that there are many problems and difficulties in implement-
ing this ideal of refinement. First it is difficult to differentiate between the 
cases in which our representatives refine our views in a way that promote 
our values and principles and cases in which they deviate from our inner 
values and act in accordance with values that are alien to us. Further, even 
if in principle we could identify what a legitimate refinement is and what 
counts as betrayal on the part of our representatives, it may be easy on the 
part of political institutions and politicians to manipulate and act on the basis 
of values which conflict with those of the public. But all of these observa-
tions do not undermine the basic insight, namely that self-governance is 
not a mechanical process by which representatives (operating like robots) 
simply mirror or replicate the views of the majority; instead, they need to 
evaluate the underlying reasons and refine these judgments in light of these 
values. The process of refinement may often serve to mitigate although not 
to eliminate the tension between individual and collective self-governance.
CONCLUSION
What I have tried to show in this essay is that the historical observations 
of Gargarella do not merely provide a deep understanding of the past but 
also new insights about the present and potentially the route to improve the 
future. Precisely as the coalition between the liberals and the conservatives 
served to entrench economic inequalities in the 19th century, so I argued, the 
coalition between populists and nationalists is being used as a means of dis-
tracting political attention away from the economic challenges of our society. 
I also argued that collective self-governance does not imply the automatic 
endorsement of any majoritarian decision or conviction; at times, collective 
self-governance requires refining public opinion and, such a refinement is 
more faithful to collective self-governance than mere deference to public 
opinion. I think those observations corroborate my conviction that learning 
past politics as Gargrarella has done sheds light on the present and the future 
of politics and may provide guidelines for political activists.
4 The Federalist Papers, No. 10 (Madison). 
14 Alon Harel
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 49, mayo - agosto de 2021, pp. 5-14
REFERENCES 
gargarella, r. The Legal Foundations of Inequality. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Harel, A. Chief Justice Barak Legal Revolutions and What Remains of Them: The Autho-




Sontag, S. On Photography. London: Penguin Books, 1977. 
The Federalist Papers. Disponible en: https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text
